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'.
In February,
Nationalist and one Communist member. This committeo
appointed "field-teams" whose duty it was to put
into effect in the various areas all agreements
dealing with the cessation of hostilities.
1946, there followed a further agreement which
included a scheme for orging and demobilising the
Kuomintang and Communist armios - rogarded by tho
National Government as the crux of the whole problem.
6. The high hopes of a lasting settlement which
had been raised by these decisions were unfortunately
not fulfilled. The formation of a coalition governm..
was held up by haggling over percentages of
representation and allotment of portfolios.
Agreement
proved impossible on the application of the armistice
agreement to Manchuria, and fighting broke out in that
area and subsequently spread to China proper. No
attempt was meanwhile made to proceed with the scheme
for the merging of tho Kuomintang and Communist armies.
7.
The deep-seated and mutual distrust between
the Kuomintang and the Communist would probably have
prevented agreement in any case, but the Communists
were strengthened in their attitude at this time by
events in Manchuria. The Soviet troops who had
occupied that area on Russia's entry into the war in
1945 finally evacuatod in „pril, 1946. In withdrawing
they handed over control of the evacuation areas to
the first arrivals, and in most cases these were
Chinese Communist units, which had been infiltrating
into Manchuria from China proper since the end of the
war. It is generally accepted that this was done by
arrangement. In this way Communist forces, with
/ Soviet
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